QUESTION: Can I trust God if he does not possess exhaustive definite foreknowledge?
Excerpt from Motivations for ascribing foreknowledge to God by GREGORY A. BOYD published in “Religious Studies” (Cambridge University Press 2009).
Aside from exegetical objections, the single most frequent criticism raised against the open view in the polemical literature is that it undermines confidence in providence. To illustrate, this criticism permeates Bruce Ware’s book, God’s Lesser Glory. According to Ware, the open view of God posits a ‘limited, passive, hand-wringing God’, who can do little more than hope for the best. ‘[W]hat is lost in open theism’, Ware contends,
… is the Christian’s confidence in God … . When we are told that God … can only guess what much of the future will bring … [and] constantly sees his beliefs about the future proved wrong by what in fact transpires … . Can a believer know that God will triumph in the future just as he has promised he will?
Inasmuch as the need for security strongly influences the faith of most people today, as it did in ancient Greece, this type of argumentation is psychologically effective. But is it valid? I do not believe that it is.
Of course, it cannot be denied that a conception of God who meticulously determines the whole of history, such as we find both in Stoicism and in the classical Augustinian-Calvinist tradition, provides more assurance to believers that everything is going ‘as planned’ than can a God who grants libertarian free will to agents. Most non-Calvinists of course argue that this extra ‘assurance’ is purchased at an unacceptably high price, for it requires, among other things, that we accept all evil as part of God’s providential plan. But more importantly, this is not what is at issue in the debate about God’s foreknowledge. Rather, the issue is over whether God gains any significant providential advantage simply by virtue of knowing the future exhaustively as a domain of settled facts (what will and will not come to pass) as opposed to a domain that includes possibilities (what might and might not come to pass). And the answer to this specific question, I argue, is that He does not, provided one agrees that God possesses unlimited intelligence.
Of course, we humans are much less in control of a future we know to be comprised of possibilities than we are a future we know to be comprised only of settled facts. But the reason for this is that we only possess a finite amount of intelligence. Hence, the more possibilities we have to anticipate and prepare for, the thinner we have to spread our limited intelligence to anticipate them. This is why playing a formidable opponent in an important game of chess, for example, is much more stressful than (say) working on an assembly line.
By contrast, if God is omniscient, there is no limit to his intelligence. This entails that God does not have a finite amount of intelligence that must be ‘spread thin’ to cover various possibilities. Rather, if God possesses unlimited intelligence, God can attend to each and every one of any number of possibilities as though each and every one was the only possibility – viz. as though each was an absolute certainty. For a God of unlimited intelligence, therefore, there is no functional difference between anticipating a possibility and anticipating a certainty. God prepares for ‘maybes’ as effectively as He does ‘certainties’. Indeed, a God of unlimited intelligence anticipates ‘maybes’ as though each was a ‘certainty’. If you ever have the misfortune of playing God at chess, you will most certainly lose. For however you may choose to move, God has been antici- pating that very move and preparing a response to it, as though you had to make this move, from the onset of the game – indeed, from before the foundation of the world (for possibilities are eternal, hence eternally known by an omniscient God).
This means that, whatever comes to pass, an open theist can say as confidently as a person who ascribes [exhaustively definite foreknowledge] to God that God had been anticipating this very event from before the foundation of the world, as though the event had to happen.
It is just that the open theist would add that, because God possesses unlimited intelligence, God did not need to foreknow the event as an eternally settled fact in order to anticipate it as though it was an eternally settled fact. Any number of other events could have occurred instead of the event that came to pass, and if any other event had come to pass, the open theist would be saying the exact same thing about it.
In the light of God’s unlimited intelligence, an open theist can affirm that every event happens with a divine purpose without having to assert that everything happens for a divine purpose. God brings an eternally prepared purpose to events, but God does not bring about (or specifically allow) all events for an eternal purpose. The open theist can thus remain as confident as any free will theist who ascribes exhaustively definite foreknowledge (EDF) to God that God can bring good out of evil and fit all events into a divine plan. But she can do so without having to make God complicit in evil.
What do you think of Boyd’s argument? Is it valid? What are it’s strengths and weaknesses?
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Jeremy L. Berg 
Hi Jeremy,
Good post. I think Ware’s statement “constantly sees his beliefs about the future proved wrong by what in fact transpires” is a bit over the top and indeed a misrepresentation the OT position. It is essentially a straw man argument.
Besides, as I was reading, I was just struck by the thought that the “conception of God who meticulously determines the whole of history” effectively eliminates the power of the cross. In this conception is no longer “Christ’s love [that] compels” our action or change of heart it is the mysterious outworking of God’s predetermined divine plan. The cross of Christ and His suffering is completely powerless to influence or change the attitudes and motives of a lost mankind unless such a response is “pre-approved” by Jesus himself.
Thus, there is really no “Power in the Blood” and nothing is really “Won through Your selfless love” as we like to sing.
If, as C.S Lewis wrote, “God became man to turn creatures into sons”, does not the brute force of determinism eliminate the power of God’s love and the voluntary response it elicits in the heart of mankind when the gospel is presented?
Ware says OT robs God of His sovereignty. I say Ware robs God of His love. This is the real tragedy. The rest is simply details.
– Leo
Thanks for the post, Jeremy. I was glancing at Boyd’s article yesterday, coincidentally. Here’s my two cents (although I could certainly be wrong on any number of points).
First some strengths (potential or actual), in no particular order:
(1) God is capable of pulling off his project without having to micromanage everything/everyone or having to have every “step” towards the goal guaranteed along the way. If good human leaders can do this and do it well, how much more could God? When humans do “lead” through micromanaging or over-structuring, we tend to consider them bad leaders. So open theists can contend that God is more meritorious and praiseworthy on their account than he is on a classical account. To put it a different way maybe—God actually has to work with some indeterminacy. Open theists can contend that this arguably requires and displays more intelligence or wisdom than is displayed by a God who “has it handed to him.” They might even say that God doesn’t even have intelligence or wisdom on the classical account—he just has knowledge. (And what about merely having knowledge is inherently excellent or praiseworthy? You could ask the same about power. Simply having power isn’t necessarily praiseworthy, or even moral. It’s what one does with one’s power that makes it praiseworthy or good.)
(2) Most people in this debate spend their time worrying about whether God’s foreknowledge restricts humanity’s freedom. But what about God’s freedom? Open theism can grant God a significant kind of freedom that classical theism might not be able to (namely libertarian freedom—the freedom to choose otherwise, a freedom under which an agent genuinely has more than merely one option in each choice). If God eternally knows everything as settled, it becomes difficult to make any meaningful sense of God having more than one option with respect to any given choice—his foreknowledge/omniscience eternally restricts his “options” to just one option on every count. The only alternative ever possible would appear to be the one that he eternally knew he would “choose” (i.e., what will happen). So, if God’s knowledge is eternally settled, it would seem that he had to create, had to answer or not answer that prayer that way, had to “elect” or not “elect” whomever or however he did, etc. He never had any other option. He certainly could have done otherwise if he had known otherwise—but there was never any time or sense in which he did know otherwise. (And if one never could have done otherwise, should we really even call one’s choice praiseworthy?)
(3) Speaking of choosing, the open theist might also have the strength of being able to offer a more meaningful conception of God’s choosing anything at all . Any act worthy of being called a choice) in any meaningful sense would appear to require a shift in one’s “intentional stance” (as Alan Rhoda puts it) with respect to a particular option. It seems that there would have to be a shift from regarding one option as merely possible/indeterminate to regarding it as actual/determinate(or even a shift from not chosen to chosen). So something would genuinely have to shift in one’s mind from a “might be” to a “will be.” But only open theism appears to grant this kind of genuine shift in God’s intentional stance. Plus, if God is truly “atemporal,” “outside of time,” or “immutable” (and thus incapable of any kind of change whatsoever), then this shift could never happen—and nothing could ever be “chosen” in any meaningful sense (much less chosen “freely”). But God actually experiences time/change according to open theists , so he can make this kind of shift. And he has genuine possibilities before him, among which he can choose. The only alternative appears to be the non-open or classical theist’s appeal to an “eternal choice.” But if you remove multiple options/alternatives and the shift from indeterminate to determinate with respect to one of those options, I’m not sure you can talk about a “choice” in any meaningful or significant sense. You’ve pretty much evacuated the word of its significance at that point. Of course, as is often the case, the classical theist might be tempted to charge the open theist with anthropomorphism here (i.e, the tendency to make God too much like ourselves in order to understand him, or to think of him in “human categories”). But the open theist might just come back with, “Hey, we just want our terms to actually communicate something—otherwise it’s just rhetoric.”
And a few weaknesses (potential or actual), in no particular order:
(1) Calling your debate opponents “polemical” right up front seems itself a little polemical. If nothing else, it doesn’t build any bridges.
(2) Boyd also makes some statements that seem to present some of the same challenges for open theism that non-open theism (i.e., “classical theism”) faces. He says, “For a God of unlimited intelligence, therefore, there is no functional difference between anticipating a possibility and anticipating a certainty. God prepares for ‘maybes’ as effectively as He does ‘certainties’. Indeed, a God of unlimited intelligence anticipates ‘maybes’ as though each was a ‘certainty’. God does not bring about (or specifically allow) all events for an eternal purpose.” If this is the case, we might question whether open theism is really any help (as it is often thought to be) when it comes to the problem of evil. God still appears to know that all of these horrendous evils are going to happen and apparently does nothing about them. So it appears that he’s allowing them nonetheless, and presumably has a good “reason” for doing so.
(3) In the broader article that this selection comes from, Boyd contends that it was from the Greek philosophers that we got our tendency to place will and will not statements in contradiction to one another. Instead, Boyd says we should place will and might not statements in contradiction (and, similarly will not and might statements). And of course, open theism grants genuine knowledge of mights and might nots to God. But part of me suspects that this placing of these kinds of statements in opposition has little to do with our Greek philosophical heritage per se and probably more to do with the fact that it’s just natural or intuitive to see will and will not statements as contradictory to one another (even if they’re technically not). To say that something will happen seems—on an intuitive level—to entail or imply the falsity that it will not happen, and vice-versa…even if this doesn’t technically follow, (as open theists—especially Alan Rhoda—do an impressive job of showing). So I’m wondering how relevant the Greeks really are for us here. God is still, as it were, allowing his children to play in traffic without coming and pulling them out of the street (like we would expect of any good parent). And if he presumably knows that the child’s in the street and “perfectly anticipates” that the semi is coming—and then does nothing—we’re still left wondering about his character, just as we are in classical theism.
Great thoughts, Shane. I love the point about the wisdom-less God of classical theists. Not sure if it would ultimately hold water (because I think it could be argued that the reality that was determined by God is somehow wise at some ultimate level), but it is still brilliant and worth further reflection.
The main difference between foreknowing and anticipating the possibility of an evil event is simply (and profoundly) that all evil that is foreknown is “necessary,” and all evil that is merely an anticipated possibility is “contingent.” Necessary evil must be attributed to the creator, contingent evil does not have to be attributed to the creator. Therefore, the only hope of a God who is not responsible for evil is a situation where evil is contingent.
Great stuff.
Shane – Thanks for your extremely articulate interaction and thoughts. I can tell you’ve wrapped your head around this issue a lot. My head hurts just trying to keep up with you.
I hope this post helps critics of the open view (and most are quite hostile) see that there really is a good case to be made for an alternative to the classical view. Without taking sides, I just think we need to elevate the conversation and further educate critics who prematurely label open theists as biblically cavalier heretics.
Dan – I agree that the central motivation of the open view is to get God off the hook for all evil in the world. These debates are so heated because nothing short of our understanding of the character of God seems to hang in the balance.
Thanks for stopping by and taking the time to comment.
Thanks, Jeremy. I agree totally about elevating the conversation. I think you’re doing a nice job of this. All positions have their strengths and weaknesses. You’re providing room for those to come to light. Most of us just see what we want to see, rarely understand other positions, and can rarely articulate the weaknesses that attend our own positions. Once we get a better sense of some of the various strengths and weaknesses attending the various positions, we can think more carefully about which strengths we think are most important (and why) and about which weaknesses we’re willing (or not willing) to live with .
And for what it’s worth, I think the strongest presentation of the open view on the philosophical front these days is clearly coming from Alan Rhoda (http://alanrhoda.net/). He strikes me as a bit more philosophically astute (and careful) than Boyd. And given that this particular debate is arguably “underdetermined” by the Biblical data (which is why people on both/all sides can use the Bible to support their position), it seems to me that the philosophical side of the discussion merits our attention. It’s in virtue of philosophy (not to mention social/community conditioning and personal preference) that people come out in different places on this topic.
Good comments, Dan.
As for your first paragraph, the open theist might want to respond that the classical theist’s potential response here doesn’t seem to address the attending issues regarding the coherence or meaningfulness of divine freedom or choice (typically implied in divine “determination”) under classical theism to begin with, not to mention the praiseworthiness of this wisdom that has never required God to work with any indeterminacy (something with which even humans are able to work commendably at times…and do humans have cognitive strengths/capabilities that God doesn’t even have? ). The open theist might say that the classicalist’s “ultimate level wisdom” response here essentially amounts to an attempt to silence the debate by definitional fiat or by “punting to mystery” (that pesky, unfalsifiable strategy for which divine transcendence always opens the door). The open theist might say it’s merely a way to avoid or to write off (a priori) the questions being raised against the classical position. In short, the open theist might say that the classicalist has not really “argued” (as you mentioned) for this “ultimate level wisdom”—he has merely asserted it (or played his “trump card”).
Your classicalist’s potential response here also brings to my mind the kind of thorny question that comes up in discussions of the relation between God and morality or virtue (i.e., “Euthyphro’s dilemma”). In that context, the question is basically “Is something good because God says it is; or does God say it’s good because it is good?” (And this question is actually profoundly relevant right now, given how much discussion is going on in the philosophical, theological, and popular literature about the morality/character of God as portrayed in the Old Testament). Transposing to the sovereignty discussion, the question becomes “Is the result of God’s sovereign determination (either of all things directly, per Calvinism, or of which possible world to actualize, per Molinism) wise/good because God determines it; or does God sovereignly determine the result because it is wise/good?
Regarding your second paragraph, Dan, I wonder if someone like a William Lane Craig would challenge how you’re working with necessity here, charging you with committing a “modal fallacy.” He might say (as he does in the Four Views book on divine foreknowledge when discussing divine sovereignty and human freedom on p. 126) that you’re essentially arguing:
(1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
(2) God foreknows x.
(3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.
He says that (3) doesn’t follow from (1) and (2), calling this a common fallacy in modal logic (the logic of necessity and contingency). Instead, he says, what follows is (3’): Therefore, x will happen. And this doesn’t say anything about the necessity of x’s happening, but only that it will happen.
Of course, we can grant him that this might still allow for the possibility of our freely making x happen (without being necessitated to make it happen), but I’m not sure it would do the same for God’s own freedom. God can’t choose contrary to what he eternally knows will be the case. (Pointing out that God’s knowledge “follows” his presumably free determination/choice—albeit in a “logical” but not “temporal” sense—doesn’t seem to help me. Nor does sticking middle knowledge in there and saying it “logically precedes” his choice to create. But I admittedly have to study the middle knowledge case quite a bit more.)
I guess my only question is this: Has there ever been any time or sense in which God DIDN’T KNOW what will and will not be the case about the actual future in every respect (or, given Molinism, what he himself would do or would not do when presented with all possible worlds)? If not (as I presume the classicalist would want to maintain), then all genuine might beand might not be propositions that are incompatible with the will not be and will be propositions, respectively, would seem to me to be ruled out. And ruling this out, to me, rules out all genuine possibility for a God with exhaustive definite foreknowledge (EDF). There are no real possibilities/alternatives—at least for God—beyond the ones that happen to materialize in reality. Am I missing something here? I certainly might be, so let me know if you’re seeing me make some sketchy inferences or assumptions.
Thanks for the much welcomed break from paper researching/writing, by the way! :-)
Hmmmm…looks like I haven’t quite figured the HTML out altogether yet. :-) That big block of italics in my first paragraph shouldn’t be italicized.